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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The concept of a cool head and a warm heart co-existing is a Buddhist principle which 
attempts to illustrate compassion and pragmatism as mutually compatible, not mutually 
exclusive.  Without intelligent management, compassion is lost in its ineffectiveness, and 
without compassion, intelligence is purposeless reason.  This equilibrium is exactly the vision 
of microfinance that drives this paper: an important social and moral idea that is nevertheless 
affected by the world and environment in which it operates.  By examining the governance 
mechanisms affecting microfinance in Cameroon, namely the Ministry of Finance and the 
management structure of the firms themselves, an idea emerges of constructive actions to take 
to allow this industry to flourish in an environment that isn’t always conducive to 
accomplishing the industry goals.  With an end objective of identifying proactive steps to be 
taken by the state and by individual microfinance firms, this paper examines the relationship 
between microfinance and governance generally, and uses the specific example of the MC2 
micro-bank network overseen by the Appropriate Development for Africa Foundation 
(ADAF, who also embraces the idea of a heart in their logo and motto).    Ultimately, by 
understanding the cool head of governance, the warm heart of microfinance’s social mission 
will be allowed to takes its proper place.     
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INTRODUCTION 
I: Context  
Cameroon, situated in West-Central Africa, has a population of 18.2 million, 
approximately 7.3 million of whom live below the national poverty line1.  However, when 
examining the rural population of 8.1 million, it is found that approximately 4 million are 
defined as living in poverty, or a full 50% of the rural population, versus 41% of the total 
population2.  Cameroon’s GDP per capita is 2,300 USD, ranking 178th in the world, and its 
GDP growth rate is 3.3%, 115th in the world3; but, taking population growth into account, the 
GDP per capita growth rate is much lower, at 1.6%4, a statistic that is a much more accurate 
reflection of quality of life.  GDP is heavily driven by agriculture which comprises 43.6% of 
GDP and 70% of labor-force employment5.  Unfortunately, the access to financial services for 
those living in rural areas and hence those involved in agriculture is severely limited, 
especially to the 4 million rural poor.  To fill this supply gap, over 500 microfinance firms 
have come into being in Cameroon between 1990 and 2009 who are attempting to give the 
poor and very poor access to savings, loans, and other financial services.  
 
II: Problem Statement  
With so many people depending solely on these independent institutions for financial 
services and an increasingly large portion of the formal and informal Cameroonian economy 
driven by these non-governmental entities, the state began to regulate the industry in 1992 and 
is still today refining its approach.  The microfinance institutions themselves are faced with a 
continually-growing market, exponentially increasing interest in the sector with its publicized 
                                                 
1
  “Cameroon”.  CIA World Factbook.  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook.  2009. 
2
 “Cameroon Statistitcs”.  Rural Poverty Portal.  www.ruralpovertyportal.org.  2006. 
3
 CIA World Factbook. 
4
 Rural Poverty Portal.  
5
 CIA World Factbook. 
 7 
successes, and an increased potential for demand as the population grows6.  How, therefore, 
should the state and microfinance institutions manage the current micro-credit sector while 
building capacity for greater services in the future to fulfill the goals of alleviating poverty 
and empowering the poor?   
 To understand the role governance of the state and of the microfinance institutions has 
in the future of the micro-credit industry is to understand how the state and the institutions 
interact, and the management structure of microfinance firms.  Governance has emerged as 
the key word in the study of efficacy7 and has been proposed as a solution to many of the 
current problems facing the industry, and also as the key to increasing the depth and breadth 
of the micro-credit sector.  Governance of the state affects the microfinance firms and the 
environment in which they operate, and governance of the firms themselves directly affects 
the definition of their objectives and their ability to achieve their goals8.  By understanding 
the governance of the state and of the firms themselves, it is possible to define the key to 
increasing efficacy in the present and unlocking a world of potential for the future.   
 
III: Objectives  
The main objective of this work it to understand the effect state governance and the 
management organization of the institutions themselves has on microfinance performance in 
Cameroon.  Specifically, this means examining:  
• State regulations and their implications in microfinance creation and performance; 
• Organization of microfinance firms, specifically MC2 microbanks, and the effect 
on the achievement of the social and economic missions;  
• Perceptions of the state by microfinance firms, and perceptions of microfinance 
firms by the state;  
                                                 
6
 Triodos Facet/MicroNed.  “Trends in Microfinance 2010-2015”.  www.triodosfacet.nl. May 2009. 
7
 Demanou, Patrick.  « Séminaire annuel : Les institutions du modèle MC2 échangent sur la gouvernance, la rentabilité, le 
portefeuille crédit ». Le défi des pauvres : Modèle MC2: Une approche endogène de développement.  Vol 13 : November 
2008. (13) 
8
 Barr, Michael S.  “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law.  Volume 26:271, 05 
March 2005. 
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• Governance effects on the future of the microfinance sector. 
 
IV: Hypotheses  
From the above objectives, it is possible to draw the following hypotheses.   
1. The government has a strong influence on the operations of the microfinance institutions, 
and, through this influence, has the opportunity to greatly affect the efficacy and future 
potential of the sector.   
2. There is much room for improvement in the management of the microfinance industries 
themselves to increase their capacity.   
 
V: Methodology 
The investigation of these hypotheses was conducted through a combination of work 
in conjunction with the Appropriate Development for Africa Foundation (ADAF) in Yaoundé, 
Cameroon, and a series of interviews with microfinance practitioners, government officials, 
and ADAF partner organizations.  ADAF is a non-governmental organization that, among 
other development efforts, assists with the management of two micro-credit institutions 
(MUFFA and MC2).  It is the case of the MC2 micro-banks that was used as an example of the 
micro-credit industry.  The original goal was to be an active participant in the organization, 
but unfortunately there was little work available, so the primary method of data collection 
became interviews and primary literature. Also, no access was given to international contacts 
or partner organizations because it was stated that “ADAF could answer all questions”.  
Therefore, in an effort to gain a broad-reaching understanding in a limited amount of time, 
interviews were conducted across sectors.  High-level managers at ADAF were interviewed 
on the internal structure of both ADAF and the micro-banks, the role of the state as they 
perceived it, and opportunities for both the state and the micro-banks to improve their 
efficacy. Officials at the Ministry of Finance were also asked how the state and the 
microfinance industry can change to best advance, and were additionally questioned on the 
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regulations governing microfinance, the general perception of microfinance by the state, and 
how effective microfinance is as a force in the macro economy.  ADAF partner organizations, 
such as the Peace Corps and Afriland First Bank provided not only details on their specific 
projects with ADAF but an outside perspective on the management structures of ADAF and 
the MC2s and how that affected their ability to carry out their economic and social missions.  
Occasionally, among practitioners, it was difficult to solicit genuine responses to opinion 
questions, particularly when there was a ‘line’ or a given phrase that was easily substituted 
(e.g. a mission statement used to answer an efficiency question).  However, these given 
phrases and other supplementary literature allowed primary analysis of the policy and 
management environments, including the Banking Commission for Central African States 
regulations on microfinance institutions and the official mission statements of ADAF and 
MC2s. 
 
VI: Plan  
The plan of our work will be as follows:  
• Chapter One: Microfinance and Governance  
• Chapter Two: Microfinance Market in Cameroon  
• Chapter 3: Influence of State Actions and Regulations on Microfinance Firms  
• Chapter 4: Effect of Structure and Organization of Microfinance Firms on their 
Performance.   
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CHAPTER 1: MICROFINANCE AND GOVERNANCE 
 
I: Definitions 
 The definition of microfinance as laid out by the Banking Commission for Central 
African States is:  “an activity carried out by registered entities which do not have the status 
of banks or financial institution…and which carry out, on a regular basis, loans operations 
and/or savings collection and offer specific financial services to populations who mainly 
operate outside to [sic] traditional banking channel [sic]”9.  As is referenced in this definition, 
it is important to expand the understanding of microfinance to include all financial services, 
most importantly saving, and that services are not limited to small scale loans.   
For the purposes of this work, state governance will be understood as the laws and 
regulations governing microfinance created or adopted by the Ministry of Finance.  Also 
included are actions taken by the state that directly or indirectly affect the economic or social 
environment in which microfinance operates.  Microfinance governance will be understood as 
the organization of the management structure of microfinance firms, the adopted regulations 
outside of those created by the state, the actual lending practices, and the general 
comportment of the staff at these institutions.  These definitions serve to clarify the scope of 
the investigation of this work and limit the broad term ‘governance’ to specific actions taken 
by the state and the microfinance institutions. 
 
II: State Governance Concerns Development Generally 
 Governance is a concern to development and international aid strategies in general, 
particularly the problem of corruption within a local, regional, or federal government.  
                                                 
9
 Banking Commission for Central African States.  “CEMAC Regulation Relating to the Conditions Governing 
the Exercise and the Control of Microfinance Activities”.  Texts Relating to the Exercise of Microfinance 
Activities.  Adopted 26 January 2002.  (Part I, Article 1)  
 11 
Frankly, “a fundamental truth [is]… development depends on good governance…No country 
is going to create wealth if its leaders exploit the economy to enrich themselves, or police can 
be bought off by drug traffickers.  No business wants to invest in a place where the 
government skims 20% off the top, or the head of the port authority is corrupt”10.  Corruption 
limits investment and takes profits away from participating individuals, undermining one of 
the principle tenants of free-market economics. Other issues with governance include “low 
levels of transparency and accountability, and an absence of effective development 
strategies”, all of which “add up to a government not conducive to effective aid”11.  Not only 
does aid perform worse, but aid is less available to those governments with such practices.  
The United States, for example, under George W. Bush and Barack Obama, has had aid 
conditional on good governance, Bush through his Millennium Challenge Accounts12 and 
Obama with his declaration in Ghana that America will “increase assistance for responsible 
individuals and institutions, with a focus on supporting good governance” and “support those 
who act responsibly and to isolate those who don’t”13.   Additionally, unsound governance 
practices such as financial misregulation can contribute to financial crises, all of which affect 
the poor much more than the rich.  Financial regulation and sound economic policy are 
essential to assuring stable fiscal environments for development efforts and international aid 
to be successful.    
 
III: State Governance Concerns Micro-credit Specifically  
Arguments have been made that, to some or a large extent, microfinance is 
independent from regulatory entities, which frees them from concerns of corruption, lack of 
enforcement, or little legal support.  Micro-credit “can thrive in weak legal and other formal 
                                                 
10
 Associated Press.  “Text of President Obama’s Speech in Ghana”.  2009. 
11
 UNESCO.  “Overcoming inequality: why governance matters”. EFA Global Monitoring Report 2009.  UNESCO Press: 
Paris, France. 2008. (219) 
12
 Barr, Michael S.  “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law.  Volume 26:271, 05 
March 2005.   
13
 Obama’s Speech in Ghana 
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institutional environments because they [micro-credit institutions] largely do not have to rely 
on such formal institutions to operate…Many of the risk-mitigation techniques developed by 
microfinance institutions…are functional substitutes for legal-institution-intensive forms of 
creditor protection”14.  Joint liability is one such technique: it relies on community members 
to act as social collateral for fellow borrows, meaning, instead of pledging financial assets, 
clients have friends or co-workers guarantee a portion of the loan.  Because the community 
knows the borrowers, only reliable individuals are guaranteed and, because there is a sense of 
loyalty to that community and its members, there are social consequences to defaulting on a 
loan15.  Joint liability theoretically eliminates the need for an effective enforcement network 
or a well-developed system of credit regulation; instead, community members perform these 
offices and there is no formal institutional involvement.  As a result, “microfinance might be 
an important financial development strategy in the face of weak, incompetent, or corrupt 
governance, and in post-conflict reconstruction efforts…”16 because it allows development 
efforts to be made without tacitly or explicitly supporting malgovernance.  In fact, 
microfinance may be able to contribute to the development of better governance by helping 
“foster internal demand for political changes regarding financial repression, including easing 
interest rate controls, permitting greater foreign ownership of financial firms, and ending 
directed lending to cronies that hamper financial development…”  The “entrenched elites who 
benefit from the current system have little incentive to promote these changes even though 
financial development would benefit the country broadly”17.  By involving more people in the 
financial system and thereby providing personal, popular motivation for reform, micro-credit 
firms hold the government responsible for good regulation policy, especially considering 
microfinance clients have the potential to vastly outnumber the elites.   
                                                 
14
 Barr, Michael S.  “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law.  Volume 26:271, 05 
March 2005. (284) 
15
 Hubka, Ashley and Rida Zaidi. “Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance.” Prepared for the World 
Development Report 2005:  Improving the Investment Climate for Growth and Poverty Reduction. (3) 
16
 Barr. (284-5) 
17
 Barr (291)  
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However, the argument that microfinance is completely separate from government 
influence eventually fails, particularly as efforts are made to expand the sector to a broader 
client base and a deeper lending pool.  At a basic level, it is true that, while microfinance can 
perform independently of formal regulatory institutions, “microfinance institutions operating 
in bad legal and policy environments are likely to fare much worse than their counterparts 
elsewhere…”18.  In order to have a successful micro-credit sector as a whole, the government 
is a necessary implementer of social, economic, and financial policy.   
Micro enterprises run by poor people cannot be broadly successful simply because they 
have increased opportunities to borrow money. For large numbers of micro enterprises to be 
successful, they also need access to decent roads and affordable means of moving their 
products to markets. They need a vibrant, well-functioning domestic market itself that 
encompasses enough people with enough money to buy what these enterprises have to sell. 
Finally, micro businesses benefit greatly from an expanding supply of decent wage-paying 
jobs in their local economies. This is the single best way of maintaining a vibrant domestic 
market19. 
 
Development is more than investing money and developing human capital.  There must be 
structures in place, physically and economically, for development to be sustained and for the 
population to be able to take advantage of the new opportunities.  Economically, for example, 
the government is responsible for general macroeconomic health, and “macroeconomic 
instability can wreak havoc with microfinance programs… [malgovernance] can make 
microfinance unprofitable and unsustainable”20.  The government’s ability to control the 
economy and even the availability of information on that economy means it controls the 
environment in which the microfinance institution operates.  If, for example, there is extreme 
hyperinflation and currency value is rocketing up, no one will take out a loan because it two 
days the amount will be worthless.  Also, consider the price of certain goods in the market: if 
a farmer cannot sell her goods a profit-making price because the unstable market will not 
support it, she will not be able to pay back her loan.  If an entrepreneur cannot attract 
                                                 
18
 Barr, Michael S.  “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law.  Volume 26:271, 05 
March 2005. (285). 
19
 Pollin, Robert.  “Microcredit: False Hopes and Real Possibilities” www.fpif.org. 21 June 2007. 
20
 Barr. (284-5). 
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investors because the government does not support a good-investment environment, the 
economy loses.   
Even if a country is economically and socially healthy, financial governance has a 
huge effect on microfinance.  Firstly, financial crises caused by faulty governance affect the 
poor, the target market of microfinance, more than the rich because the poor have little to no 
savings and live financially moment to moment, whereas the rich have accrued assets or 
wealth in other forms that cushion the impact of crises.  But, even in the absence of a crisis, 
the wealthy are still in a better position, because they can “rely on relationships and ample 
assets in the face of information-poor and legally weak markets”21.  These connections and 
assets are made in the corrupt environment of poor state governance which perpetuates a 
static economic reality as opposed to mobile economic potential, one of the goals of micro-
credit.  Those who participate in corrupt business practices benefit and stay rich, whereas 
those who cannot or will not participate are marginalized and kept in poverty.  Finally, as 
microfinance strives to increase its scope and the size of its loans, it must move away from 
solely untraditional loan guarantees such as joint liability, and incorporate traditional 
enforcement structures that fall under the domain of the government and other legal and 
financial institutions.  If this enforcement fails, “relationship lending dominates and 
intermediaries do not look to a broader potential base of borrowers. Under such 
circumstances, banks lend to favored customers, but not to the broader public”22, which limits 
the scope of microfinance institutions and cripples their ability to reach the poorest poor. This 
in turn defeats the social and developmental goals of micro-credit or microfinance expansion.  
The failure to collect will also exponentially affect the social responsibilities of microfinance, 
because as more people default on their loans, fewer people will be able to acquire loans, and 
microfinance institutions will be able to take fewer risks.  The microfinance institution, as it 
                                                 
21
 Barr, Michael S.  “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law.  Volume 26:271, 05 
March 2005.  (276).   
22
 Ibid  (277-8) 
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tries to become a larger, more influential entity, will instead be reduced to functioning as a 
commercial bank, either unwilling or unable to help those that need it most.    
Therefore, micro-credit may be able to function, in a basic sense, without formal 
support, and can contribute to good governance practices.  However, in order to grow, there 
needs to be a solid governmental environment, including macroeconomic stability, financial 
regulation, and effective enforcement structures.   
 
IV: Microfinance Governance Generally 
 Like any other financial institution, microfinance efficacy is directly related to its 
management and self-governance.  To ensure good microfinance governance is to first 
institute transparency and accountability, because “the operational and financial sustainability 
of a microfinance institution requires, among other things, a clear strategic vision and an 
organizational structure that is transparent, efficient and accepted by all the stakeholders 
involved”23.  In addition to sustainability, “…provid[ing] greater transparency and becom[ing] 
more efficient in their operations…would be beneficial to donors, the institutions, and 
borrowers” involved in the micro-credit sector24.  These characteristics, while apparently self-
evident, are often lacking in this fledging industry, and simple changes could easily ensure 
sound business practices; for example, opening up financial statement or ‘balance sheets’ to 
their investors has the potential to increase investment if the balance is favorable, or elicit 
help from experts who wish to protect their investment if the balance is not favorable.  
Transparency and accountability are also crucial to ethically sound business practices, which 
is an important consideration in financial development.  Not only are the ideas ethical, but 
they directly discourage theft and corruption once instituted because crime is much easier to 
detect and track.  Transparency and accountability are also very attractive to Western 
                                                 
23
 Wessling, Ann. “Note from CAPAF: Improving Microfinance Governance” www.microlinks.org. 30 November 2007. 
24
 Barr, Michael S.  “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law.  Volume 26:271, 05 
March 2005. (283) 
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investors, so institutions who can clearly communicate the soundness of the investment to 
potential supporters from abroad have a greater chance of winning investors and sustaining 
and expanding their business.  Therefore transparency and accountability increase domestic 
and foreign involvement, which in turn leads to an increased chance of sustainability.   
 However, in such a rapidly-changing field, sustainability cannot be the end goal, or the 
institution will be left behind.  A pioneering survey carried out by the Centre for the Study of 
Financial Innovation, an independent not-for-profit think tank based in London which 
explores the future of financial services, called ‘Banana Skins’, had over 300 respondents 
from 74 countries “and is the most comprehensive survey undertaken of the risk outlook for 
microfinance”25. It concluded that the ever-increasing amount of investment into the micro-
credit sector “could overwhelm those microfinance institutions that are not equipped to meet 
the pressures of rapid growth and rising competition. The high expectations that people have 
of microfinance both as a social movement and a financial investment could be disappointed 
as a result, says a new survey of the risks facing the industry”26.  Interpretation of the survey 
concludes that “‘the most urgent need facing the industry’, said Xavier Reille of CGAP…‘is 
the need to strengthen institutions at the local level - management, boards as well as 
government regulators’”27. Increasing market importance will demand a level of governance 
equal to a commercial bank or other financial entity and the “increased competition will 
oblige providers to apply the product development and marketing strategies of a mature 
industry”. Industry development, once “development led” (from the North) will be taken over 
by commercial initiatives, increasingly coming from inside the developing world28.   
 Fortunately for the industry and its clients, the future of micro-credit is clearly in the 
hands of the micro-credit institutions themselves.  To start with,  
                                                 
25Barr,  Michael S.  “Microfinance and Financial Development”. Michigan Journal of International Law.  Volume 26:271, 05 
March 2005. (283) 
26
 Thomas, Jeanette. “Management weakness is the greatest risk facing microfinance, says new 'Banana Skins' survey” 
www.cgap.org 14 November 2009.   
27
 Ibid 
28
 Triodos Facet/MicroNed.  “Trends in Microfinance 2010-2015”.  www.triodosfacet.nl. May 2009. (6)   
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The technologies to transform microfinance already exist. Among the available 
technologies are magnetic stripe and chip (smart) cards, point  of sale devices, ATMs, cell 
phones, satellite communications, the internet, credit scoring, biometric recognition and 
more. These technologies will require microfinance institutions to redesign their business 
models and educate their employees and customers to master new ways to deliver and 
receive services. Such changes will not always be easy, but the benefits will be dramatic29. 
 
Implementation of existing technology would be the first step to increasing the viability of 
current microfinance firms in the future of the industry.  This step requires little to no outside 
assistance, and can begin immediately, two characteristics that put the decision squarely in the 
hands of the firms themselves.   
 Furthermore, according to the Banana Skins survey, “of the 29 risks - or ‘Banana 
Skins’ – identified…many of the top ones are linked to factors directly under MFIs' own 
control, such as the quality of management and corporate governance, rising costs, staffing, 
managing technology, and credit risk”: management weakness and corporate governance top 
the list30.  A reality in Central Africa is that “a large number of MFIs do not dispose of 
reliable management and information systems.  The members, staff and clients of MFIs do not 
always have all necessary management skills”31.  Improvements in management training and 
governance structures, while not as easily implemented as utilizing existing technology, are 
equally in the hands of the firms themselves and are not restricted by outside governance in 
any way.      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 Ibid, (8)  
30
 Thomas, Jeanette. “Management weakness is the greatest risk facing microfinance, says new 'Banana Skins' survey” 
www.cgap.org 14 November 2009.   
31
 “Recommendation for the Improvement and the Diligent Enforcement of the Institutional and Regulatory Framework for 
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CHAPTER TWO: MICROFINANCE MARKET IN CAMEROON 
 
I: History of Microfinance in Cameroon 
 The history of microfinance in Cameroon can be divided roughly into three time 
periods: creation, crisis, and reconstruction.  The first period, creation, began with the first 
microfinance institutions in Cameroon.  The first microfinance firm was established in the 
Anglophone zone of Cameroon in 1963 in Njinikom.  The movement spread to other areas of 
the region, and lead to the creation of the CAMCCUL network in 1968.  In 1971, 
microfinance began in the Francophone region, in Yaoundé, and two years later, a law was 
instituted that allowed cooperatives within Cameroon’s borders, facilitating the creation of 
microfinance institutions and associations.    
The second period, crisis, was prompted by the Africa-wide financial collapse of the 
1980’s.  The crisis prompted a new savings strategy and, with that new strategy, an increased 
autonomy of the cooperatives.  The law of 1992 placed the responsibility of the management 
of cooperatives on the members themselves, and mandated an internal supervisory organ 
within all microfinance institutions in Cameroon.   
 The third and last period, reconstruction, began with a law in 1998 that revised the law 
of 1992 to transfer control of microfinance firms to the Ministry of Finance instead of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, allow microfinance institutions to give services to non-members, and 
gave the Monetary Authority the ability to dissolve microfinance institutions.  Currently, 
investors are more and more demanding regarding financial accountability and transparency, 
and internal control has acquired the utmost importance32.    
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II: Current Rules and Regulations   
The more recent financial crisis of 2007 demonstrated the dependence of all financial 
institutions on the government to prevent such occurrences and ensure stability. Isaac Ngoum, 
the head of a microfinance institution in Cameroon stated that [microfinance institutions] 
must first insist on good governance.  The regulations must do their job*33.  In Cameroon, the 
main regulations governing microfinance activities were written by the Banking Commission 
for Central African States (COBAC) and therefore govern all of the countries under the 
Economic and Monetary Community for Central Africa (CEMAC).  The stated purpose of the 
these regulations is that: “…the evolution and growth of microfinance structures in the 
Central African sub-region…require the setting up of a framework to regulate the activities of 
microfinance structures in order to secure saving and enable the financing of basic economic 
initiatives”34.  The two main governing bodies are the Monetary Authority of each state, 
meaning the Ministry of Finance in Cameroon, and COBAC.  However, “COBAC shall only 
be able to give its opinion after consultation with the Monetary Authority…any refusal to 
grant licence shall be motivated and notified to the applicant by the Monetary Authority”, so 
the “absolute” monetary authority in Cameroon is the Ministry of Finance35.  To apply, there 
must be a promoter or manager in place, as well as a general assembly or a list of members36.  
A certain amount of minimum capital, depending on the category of microfinance institution, 
must be already raised, and an institution file must be created and submitted37.  This file, 
which will be passed on from the Monetary Authority to COBAC, must include the following 
documents:  
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• a stamped application specifying the requested category 
• a registration Certificate 
• the minutes of the general meeting for the creation of the institution, 
• the Articles of Association of the Institution  
• a list of founding members or shareholders  
• the members of the Board of Directors or of the organ considered as such 
• where necessary, documents testifying that payments have been made in connection 
with the liberation of subscribed shares, supported by bank statements or any other 
documents serving as such  
• a three year forecast of the activity, expansion and organization 
• a detail of technical and financial means to be used as well as any element likely to 
enlighten the competent authorities38.  
 
When questioned on the conditions of rejection, individuals responded that not 
meeting any of the requirements was a condition for rejection, including any of the workers 
having been in prison, not having minimum capital, or the managers not meeting the 
intellectual requirements39.  When asked how many applications are rejected versus how 
many are accepted, he responded some are rejected some are accepted; he didn’t have the 
exact numbers.   
The Banking Commission also has regulations governing the financial environment in 
which the microfinance institutions operate, or “the regulations relating to the financial 
balance of institutions and more generally, those relating to the sustainability of the 
Microfinance sector”40.  Specifically,  
It shall define the regulations relating to:  
• the conditions for resorting to borrowings  
• the conditions for taking shares in such institutions  
• the management norms that the institutions are bound to comply with in order to 
guarantee their liquidity, their solvency, and the balance of their financial situation,  
• the accounting plan  
• the consolidation of accounts  
• and the publishing of accounting documents as well as any other information needed 
by the competent authorities and the public,  
• the conditions under which these institutions can buy shares and grant loans to their 
members, shareholders, directors, and staff  
• the notion of locality with regard to the drawing of cheques, 
• the limits applying to institutions with regard to secondary transactions 
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• the minimum number of members and the maximum of shares to be held by one 
member in a First Category institution 
• the modifications of the legal status41.  
 
The Banking Commission also, for those institutions organized into networks, controls 
the umbrella organ, and the umbrella organ must file an annual report for its network42.   In 
addition, the Banking Commission can “carry out on-the-spot controls in affiliated 
institutions”43.   
Ministry of Finance supervision also continues after creation.  The State demands a 
prudential ratio of loans to savings, and one person cannot hold more than 15% of shares in 
any one Category I institution44.  However, the government does not exercise interest rate 
controls on microfinance institutions, only on commercial banks, allowing microfinance more 
flexibility when adjusting to default rates or poor macroeconomic markets45.  Additionally, 
microfinance clients or members who aren’t content with services come to Ministry of 
Finance to complain46.  It is worthy to note that there are people complaining about 
microfinance, but the Ministry of Finance is not incredibly accessible.  Visiting hours, for 
example, start at noon and end at five, leaving clients who have businesses or those who have 
children in a difficult position.  But, if enough complaints are logged or the microfinance 
institution is found to be operating unsatisfactorily, the Banking Commission has the power to 
appoint a “temporal administrator”, and, if the degree of inefficiency warrants it, the 
commission also has the power to liquidate the institution47.  In the words of a Ministry 
official: we have the power to grant your existence; we have the power to take away that 
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existence48.  In general, it is very difficult to follow the rules and regulations of the Ministry 
of Finance and COBAC because they are difficult to read and interpret49.  This can certainly 
pose a problem when the state both creates the difficult rules and reserves the right to 
liquidate if the rules are not followed.   
 
III: Structure of Microfinance Sector in Cameroon  
 Within Cameroon, microfinance firms are either divided into networks or operate 
individually.  The networked institutions, like MC2s and MUFFAs, tend to have more of a 
social-mission focus, and, as will be examined later, have many operational and financial 
advantages over those microfinance institutions that operate individually.  Those that do 
choose to operate outside a network tend to be more project- and profit-oriented; an example 
is ACEP-Cameroon.  They have the ability to fund projects nationally and internationally.    
 
IV: Categories of Microfinance Institutions in Cameroon 
Under the Monetary Authority, microfinance institutions are divided into three 
categories.  Category one firms are associations, meaning they provide savings, loans, and 
non-financial services only for their members.  MC2s are category one firms, also known as 
cooperatives.  Category two firms are sociétés anonymes, meaning they offer savings and 
loans to the general public.  Unity Cooperative Society (UNICS) recently changed from a 
category one to a category two.  Category three firms do not offer any savings, only loans50.  
In general, category two firms are considered the riskiest, and therefore must also apply to the 
National Credit Council in addition to the Ministry of Finance and COBAC.  An institution 
must apply to a specific category. 
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V: Organization of the MC2 Network 
 The Appropriate Development for Africa Foundation (ADAF) is a non-governmental 
organization formed in 1992 to, firstly, bring direction to microfinance structures in 
Cameroon, and, secondly, to support rural development in Cameroon51.  The underlying goal 
is to give the people the power to take care of themselves and develop their own world52.  
Under the oversight of ADAF, there are, among other projects, two networks of microfinance 
firms: MC2s or the rural micro-banks, and MUFFAs or the urban microfinance firms uniquely 
for women.  MC2s get their name from the formula: “Victory over Poverty (VP) can be 
achieved provided that the Means (M) and Competences (C) of the Community (C) are 
pooled together (VP = M x C x C = MC2)”, with “the main mission of the MC2 model 
[being] to provide local populations with a development tool that will help them achieve self-
reliance both at individual and community levels”53.  MC2s follow a very specific, five-state 
development process.  Stage One is sensitization of the poor, including the importance of 
savings in development, emphasis on self-reliance and a pride in self-sufficiency.  State Two 
is a mobilization of general savings and investments to begin the financial institution, Stage 
Three is financing individual, income-generating activities, and Stage Four is financing group 
activities.  Stage Five, the last stage, is the implementation of social development projects in 
addition to the financial and economic development instigated by the micro-credit activities54.  
This process is to work towards their two-fold objective: “an economic objective: economic 
and financial sustainability [and] a social objective: targeting the poor, micro, and small-scale 
activities”55.   MC2s offer financial and non-financial services, including “savings, loans, 
money transfers, other banking facilities, micro insurance…support and consultation services, 
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training, acquisition of various inputs, etc.”56  The number of members and clients using these 
services in the entire MC2 network in 2007 was 849,030, a leap forward from 2000 when 
members and clients numbered just 219,410, and, in total, the MC2 network has allocated 
loans for more than 30 billion FCFA since 199257.  The MC2s are clearly rooted in the 
communities: in fact, the MC2s were instituted for the populations of a given community, at 
the time by those who live there or grew up in there and live elsewhere, who put their 
financial means and know-how together in order to solve the issue of the community 
development*58.   
It is important to note that ADAF does not strictly manage MC2s in the sense that it is 
not concerned with their day-to-day affairs.  The three staff members of MC2s (secretary-
treasurer, accountant, and cashier) take care of the actual operation of the facility.  Even when 
there is an internal problem, MC2s have a Council of Elders that will mitigate conflicts, apply 
social pressure to defaulters, and assist with other problems encountered in day-to-day 
activities.  What ADAF helps oversee is the formation of employees, compliance with rules 
and regulation of the Ministry of Finance and COBAC, and adherence to the complex 
accounting norms set forth by the same regulatory agents.  The most important concepts of 
training MC2 workers are that, ultimately, the cooperative is their own; managers must have 
the appropriate skills and good management habits; the loan-to-savings ratio determines the 
amount of money an MC2 can give out at once; to limit conflict of interest, Board of 
Directors, staff, and the Wise Council cannot have more that 30% of net equity fund; there 
will be consequences to violating any ratio set forth by the state59.  The largest monitoring 
                                                 
56
 Ibid 
57
 Bomda, Justin.  « Microfinance, un secteur en pleine expansion au Cameroun ». Le défi des pauvres : Modèle MC2: Une 
approche endogène de développement.  Vol 13 : November 2008. (3) 
*Original Quote : « En fait, les MC sont mises en place par les populations d’une communauté donnée, a la fois par ceux qui 
y résident ou les originaires de cette localité vivant a l’extérieur, qui mettent leurs moyens financiers et leur savoir-faire pour 
essayer de résoudre ensemble le problème de développement de la communauté »  
58
 Bomda, Justin.  Télévision Interview, CRTV.  Patrick Demanou, transcription.  « Interview a l’issue du séminaire annuel 
du réseau : La Microfinance est une chance pour l’Afrique ». Le défi des pauvres : Modèle MC2: Une approche endogène de 
développement.  Vol 13 : November 2008. (19) 
59
 Tchomobe, Pierre.  Personal Interview (See Works Cited for full information)  
 25 
effort put forth by ADAF is watching the liquidity of each back.  If there are not enough 
funds, the community experiences a panic, there is a bank run, and the bank must close.  This 
results in a loss of confidence in that particular MC2, MC2s in general, and, in most cases, a 
loss of confidence in all financial institutions, defeating the social mission of all MC2s and 
microfinance60.    
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CHAPTER 3: INFLUENCE OF STATE ACTIONS AND 
REGULATION ON MICROFINANCE FIRMS  
 
I: Strengths  
There are several aspects of governance in Cameroon that contribute to the overall 
health of the microfinance sector, including the general acceptance of the microfinance 
industry as a tool in the fight against poverty.  The opinion of the state is that microfinance is 
a vehicle to fight poverty and to ‘bankilize’ the poor, or to provide access to financial services 
and increase general savings rates61.  Microfinance is closer to the poor than the state is, so 
microfinance institutions are better suited to provide financial services and execute other 
development efforts62.  In Cameroon, a director of a microfinance institution phrases it well, 
saying that microfinance institutions are an indisputable lever to economic development and 
the fight against poverty*63.   The main basis for this claim as an “indisputable lever” is the 
unique access microfinance has to the poor.  Individuals in poverty, according to COBAC, 
have “unsatisfied banking and financial needs” that microfinance firms are able to fill. As a 
result, these previously impoverished clients can, through microfinance, “secure saving and 
enable the financing of basic economic initiatives”64.  Since there is very little profit that is 
available in lending to the very poor, commercial entities have little motivation.  By contrast, 
socially-motivated institutions like microfinance firms are ideally compelled not by profit but 
by development goals, and therefore are more willing and able to take on high-risk loans.  
These loans translate into “higher household incomes, increase[d] savings rates, smooth 
consumption pattern and… [diverse] sources of income generation” which all contribute to 
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more economically sound practices and an increased ability to contribute to economic 
development within a country.  Additionally, microfinance has been proven to empower its 
clients, and “empowerment is at the center of human progress”65.  Microfinance clients and 
their families have improved health, including better nutrition and higher immunization rates; 
more participation in education; and increased gender equality, including “increased 
confidence and assertiveness, and increased participation in household and community 
decision-making”66.   
The second strength is the attempt at regulation represented by the COBAC 
regulations, created partially in reaction to the surge of microfinance institutions.  According 
to James Beighle, Associate Director at the Peace Corps in Cameroon, “one of the biggest 
issues with microfinance is that…there are all these international donor organizations that are 
pumping money into it, and so everybody wants a piece of that…so the COBAC 
regulations…were written to prevent some of these organizations from coming in a stealing 
people’s money”67.  The COBAC regulations, including the demand for a minimum amount 
of capital, aim to eliminate these profit-seeking entities.  Without minimum capital, the sheer 
volume of enterprises looking to get a piece of the foreign development aid “could overwhelm 
the supervisory authority, create moral hazard for m[icro]f[inance] i[nstitution]s not yet ready 
to face the discipline of the market, and present a[n] …opportunity for undercapitalized 
financial institutions searching for a way around more rigorous prudential standards and 
supervision applied to banks”68.  Category one firms, in lieu of minimum capital, are required 
to set up a solidarity fund to cover deficits accumulated during the fiscal year69.  This fund 
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functions in a cooperative the same way that minimum capital does in an enterprise: it 
demands previous investment by members into the institution and insures the ability of the 
firm to cover certain operating costs from the beginning. 
The acknowledgement of the importance of microfinance and the regulation of entry 
into the sector are important beginning steps to fostering a positive operating environment.   
 
II: Obstacles  
The Cameroonian government creates or fails to address several key obstacles.  The 
first major obstacle is the application process.  The application process can sometimes take 
too long or become too convoluted for a microfinance firm to maintain momentum, and the 
desire and capacity for development disappears70. In an independent seminar concerning 
microfinance in CEMAC, a document was published calling for specific clarifications of the 
COBAC regulations.  This treatise, signed by the National Association of Microfinance 
Institutions in Cameroon (ANEMCAM), included examples such as  
the understanding of the phrase ‘complete application’ is made difficult by the last point on 
the list of documents to present (article 23, line 3, in fine) for it does not give a precise 
definition of the terms ‘financial and technical resources’; Such is the case with the 
interpolated clause ‘every element likely to enlighten the competent authorities’ gives to the 
monetary authority a discretionary power of appreciation71  
 
Additionally, “the MFI promoters are not sufficiently informed about the 
licensing procedure and are unaware of ways to appeal for reconsideration”72.  With 
unclear application procedures, microfinance institutions could be getting rejected on 
technicalities rather than on the true merit of their proposals.   
It is also clear that the development of new markets for microfinance is going to 
require guidance and a vision, and that development particularly at “bottom of that pyramid 
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will continue to require support…to bring new clients on the radar screen… [and] to pilot new 
processes and products”73.  The demand side, meaning increasing the number of microfinance 
clients and the knowledge of those clients, is a key factor in the future of microfinance74.  
Education, in fact, was cited as a specific limiting factor of microfinance development and 
MC2 efforts. The problem is two-fold: one, the general comprehension by the community of 
financial services and the role of banks is not conducive to the introduction of these financial 
resources into the community; and two, in certain areas, the population does not understand 
that its they, themselves, that must develop their own community*75.  Both of these facets of 
education could be undertaken by the microfinance firms themselves, like those that ADAF 
runs for the MC2 network, or they could be undertaken by the state in a country-wide effort to 
encourage effective participation in microfinance development efforts.  The problem, 
therefore, is not a lack of ability to educate, but a lack of a clear division of responsibility or a 
lack of communication between the state and the microfinance sector on who is responsible 
for which aspects of the sector.  The solution to this problem then lies in either creating a clear 
division of responsibilities, perhaps in a written document to be agreed upon by all 
microfinance institutions when they are officially chartered by the state, or in opening an 
official channel of communication between the microfinance institutions in Cameroon and the 
state on issues such as this to which responsibilities fall on whom.   
There are also obstacles cited by ADAF that are clearly within the realm of state 
governance.  One obstacle is infrastructure, both physical and technological.  MC2s are in 
rural areas because that is where the most need lies, and oftentimes one MC2 serves a large 
area; in the Extreme North, for example, there are clients that are a three-hour motorcycle ride 
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away from the MC276.  This is not entirely a function of the distance however77.  The roads are 
in such bad shape that a 90 kilometer stretch can take over 6 hours78.  This is not conducive to 
anything but the most basis financial interactions, such as deposits or withdrawals, and limits 
the ability of the MC2 to effectively institute community outreach activities or formation 
activities.  Even if the MC2 offered weekly financial management courses, for example, three 
hours by moto over bad roads is a strong deterrent to participation.  Roads also affect the 
ability for microfinance clients to generate revenue to pay back their loans.  Without the 
ability to send goods to market or to get to their fields, the borrowers are unable to sell their 
goods and unable to pay back loans, crippling rural microfinance efforts.   
Consistent access to electricity is also a very important issue in the creation and 
continuation of microfinance services.  Cameroon, after the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, has the largest potential for electrical power, but the power supply is frequently cut 
without notice to conserve energy for the week or month ahead.  This not only interrupts daily 
business activities and access to information, but Pierre Tchomobe adds that there are 
seminars planned with practitioners and academics coming in from all over the country, and 
the entire plan for a day or a weekend is unaccomplished because there is no power for 
presentation tools, laptops, or lights79.  With workers unable to meet, share experiences, and 
improve on existing practices, there is no investment in human capital, leading to an overall 
stagnation of knowledge in the field.   
Technologically, the limited supply of information technology is a hugely damaging80.  
Any financial institution requires exact data entry and tracking abilities, and microfinance 
especially so.  With short-term loans being one of the largest offerings of microfinance 
institutions, there is even more data to collect within a short time period, and with savings and 
                                                 
76
 Personal Communication, Peace Corps Volunteer.   
77
 Informal Interview, MC2 President. (See Works Cited for full information)  
78
 This particular example is encountered between Yaoundé in the Central Province, and Ngaoundere, in the Adamaoua 
province.   
79
 Tchomobe, Pierre. Personal Interview (See Works Cited for full information).  
80
 Tchomoboe, Pierre.  Personal Interview (See Works Cited for full information)  
 31 
loans representing large portions of clients’ wealth, losing track of assets becomes 
proportionally catastrophic.  Without computers, this information is all kept on paper and all 
calculations are done by hand.  This obviously increases the chance for human error and adds 
unnecessary risk: physical material is much more easily lost or damaged than computerized 
information.  Additionally, inconsistent Internet access limits the ability of MC2s to take full 
advantage of the strengths of a network81.  As of now, it is difficult to ensure transfer of funds 
from MC2 to MC2, because there is no way to send the money, nor any way of confirming the 
receipt of funds, and well as making communication difficult.    This limits the ability of the 
MC2s to expand and strengthen their network.  Meanwhile, attached to the Chad-Cameroon 
Pipeline, there is the technology that would allow widespread Internet access for Cameroon82, 
but the government has not made the proper infrastructure investments.  The lack of access to 
technology and Internet falls squarely in the hands of the government and their inability or 
unwillingness to secure existing technology for its businesses.    
Finally, corruption is an issue cited by almost everyone questioned about microfinance 
and governance.  With officials demanding bribes to accept microfinance applications, 
widespread theft, and general mistrust of government workers, it is not only difficult to have 
successful microfinance, but it is nearly impossible to build the necessary communication 
channels and partnerships to take microfinance to the next level.  Microfinance firms should 
not have to account for bribes in their budgets and minimum capitals.   
 
III: Recommendations 
While the idea of regulation is a strength, the actual rules are difficult to read and 
interpret.  Therefore a first step for the Cameroonian government would be to either simplify 
the regulations or publish a summary text to be used universally by all microfinance 
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institutions, distribute this text, and offer annual seminars on the implications of each 
regulation and restriction.  This would also offer an opportunity for self-examination and 
revision, and a forum to hear problems with the laws from those that are most affected.  There 
is also a difficulty in the state possessing both room to interpret the regulations and the ability 
to liquidate firms.  This dual power allows little room for error in microfinance.  While 
exactitude and regulation is a positive aspect of governance, arbitrary decisions and unclear 
laws are problematic, especially combined with the power to liquidate firms that do not abide 
by those regulations.  Perhaps ANEMCAM having to approve all liquidations would be an 
effective countermeasure.   
To address other problems they see as severe, ADAF suggests three actions for the 
government to take: address problems inherent in the judicial system, increase educational 
and formational efforts, and support to microfinance institutions giving longer-term loans.  
The judicial system as it stands allows debtors to bribe officials to avoid punishment, and 
creates a culture where individuals apply for microfinance loans with no intention of paying 
the loans back.  Allowing better enforcement efforts would directly impact default rates and 
MC2 profits.  Better educational efforts, as already addressed, would both decrease default 
rates and increase the number of individuals able to effectively use microfinance services.  
Support of longer-term loans directly addresses a government critique of microfinance 
institutions: they are ill-equipped to address the needs of farmers who are beginning an 
enterprise, severely limiting the reach of microfinance as far as agriculture is concerned83.  A 
rubber plantation, for example, takes four years to produce a profit, and, currently, 
microfinance institutions are not able to handle loans of that magnitude for that extended 
period of time.  ADAF suggests the state work in conjunction with ANEMCAM to underwrite 
part of these higher-risk, longer-termed loans.   
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This last point is indicative of a larger problem that exists between state governance 
and microfinance institutions.  This problem has two main aspects: one is the ‘blame game’ 
that is played, and another is the potential for over-reliance.  The Sous-Directeur of 
Microfinance explicitly mentioned the inability of microfinance institutions to lend in the 
long-term as a weakness of the industry and a problem that needs to be solved, but ADAF 
believes that it is the government’s responsibility to help support the viability these loans.  
Combined with the example of demand-side education, a pattern emerges: the government 
and microfinance sector often agree on the problems that exist, but then neither one does 
anything about the problem and instead claims that it is the responsibility of the other actor to 
come up with a solution.  The ‘blame game’ leads to a stagnation of development efforts of 
the industry itself, and fosters animosity between the two actors, excluding the possibility for 
cooperation between two of the most important performers in economic development.   
The second aspect of the problem is over-reliance or over-confidence in the industry as 
a whole.  It is clear that microfinance relies on good governance practices to flourish, and that 
the government acknowledges the importance of microfinance in the fight against poverty.  
However, in its eagerness to support the new industry, the government seems to shelve its 
share of economic development responsibility.  During the interview with the Sous-Directeur 
of Microfinance, the emphasis was placed on the development of the microfinance sector 
almost as a replacement to any Ministry of Finance efforts in the same area.  Microfinance 
cannot and should not take the place of government efforts at development.  Without 
infrastructure, education (general education of the population, such as literacy efforts, is 
without dispute the domain of state governance), macroeconomic stability, and a clear vision 
for the general development of a country, microfinance simply empowers individuals into a 
weak environment in which true success is impossible.  Therefore, a danger of the near future 
could be an over-abundance of faith in the microfinance industry and a laissez-faire approach 
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to the macroeconomic environment, which is a recipe for frustration and for brain-drain of 
qualified, empowered individuals to better environments.  The seemingly paradoxical 
combination of over-reliance and laying blame is an indicator of the looming dead-lock in 
microfinance: the government acknowledges the potential of microfinance, but thinks that by 
that acknowledgement it has no remaining economic development responsibilities.  In reality, 
assuring access to financial services by the poorest parts of the population… requires 
“preparatory action”…teaching skills or helping poor people to generate an initial capital to 
set up an economic activity and to “appear” on the radar screen of MFIs. Even more basic is 
fundamental support to assure access to basic education, health and a decent place to live, 
pre-conditions to graduate poor people out of (extreme) poverty.84 
 
The government should not and cannot let microfinance be the only vehicle in the fight 
against poverty.  If this stays the unofficial attitude, microfinance will stagnate and eventually 
disappear, leaving the embittered poor with one more failed development attempt behind 
them.  The government must take serious steps to tackle the basic problems of absolute 
poverty by addressing the basic needs of its population in addition to contributing to 
microfinance efficacy by incorporating microfinance principles into school curriculum, 
refining the application procedure, and build a comprehensive, clearly defined partnership 
with the microfinance industry.  Only by this dual action and a true fulfilment of their 
responsibilities to its citizens can Cameroon be truly accomplishing meaningful, sustainable 
development.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: EFFECT OF STRUCTURE AND 
ORGANIZATION OF MICROFINANCE FIRMS ON THEIR 
PERFORMANCE  
 
 
I: Strengths  
The first strength of MC2s is that they are community owned and implemented, 
meaning they place themselves where there is true need, and are few other options for savings 
and loans.  The pride that comes with this self-ownership is another form of empowerment of 
the community, an important aspect of development.  Additionally, because of their close 
relationship with Afriland First Bank, people are reassured as to their credibility, 
sustainability, and efficacy.  The partnership with Afriland also gives co-financing or re-
financing of loans and insured savings up to a certain amount, increasing the financial 
viability of the MC2s85.    
Theoretically, the idea of organizing microfinance firms into a network is very 
attractive.  Forming a network gives an opportunity to share limited resources, collaborate 
without competition, and hear from experienced practitioners.  Five years ago, the MC2s 
created a network among themselves which has since helped with many aspects of their social 
and financial missions.  The network can function as a supervisor, helping identify problems 
or weaknesses in individual MC2s and negotiating group rates on external auditors to assure 
compliance with accounting norms.  It also can buy goods in bulk, such as fertilizer or seed, 
to aid projects that are happening around the country, and can sell those goods at a reduced 
price.  The headquarters also provides reserves for the bank, meaning each MC2 has access to 
loans if they are in dire financial straits.  These loans can help solve liquidity problems or 
misbalanced ratios, and the bank pays back the loan at below-market-rate interest86.  
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Collaborations like this have the potential to greatly reduce operating costs, hence allowing 
MC2s to funnel more capital into financial and social development projects.    
Linked to the creation of these networks, “it is generally recognized that the 
development of structures at meso level (credit bureaus, training centres and consultancy 
services, micro finance associations, local wholesalers) has contributed a lot to a sound 
development of the M[icro]F[inance] industry. They provide services that make it easier for 
M[icro]F[inance]I[nstitution]s to manage their risks and that allow to concentrate on their 
core business”87.  ADAF fits this definition perfectly.  They provide training services, 
financial audits, and other overseeing functions to allow MC2s to concentrate on their 
financial services rather than on logistics and technicalities.  In fact, a belief held at ADAF is 
that MC2s do not have the capacity to completely manage themselves, which why ADAF 
provides the services it does.   
However, ADAF does not manage MC2s in their day-to-day activities but rather 
assures compliance with regulations and prudential norms.  To manage the minutiae of 76 
microfinance firms under one management organization would be too much, and ADAF 
would not be able to implement any other projects.  The MC2s have their own management 
structure put in place, made up of an Administrative Council, the Executive Secretariat, and 
the Council of Elders.  The Administrative Council is synonymous to a Board of Directors, 
and hence handles the macro-management of the micro-bank.  These positions are elected at 
the first meeting of the General Assembly88.  The Executive Secretariat is comprised of the 
Secretary-Treasurer, the Accountant, and the Cashier, who work at the MC2s and therefore are 
occupied with the daily functions and smooth running of the MC2; these positions are hired 
with consultation from Afriland First Bank89.  The Council of Elders, a defining characteristic 
of the MC2, is comprised of members of the community who hold social or traditional power; 
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there are no more than 14 members.  The council wields significant power in the West and 
North where often traditional authorities, like Bamileke chiefs and Muslim lamidats, hold 
influential positions on the council and in the community.   If individuals default on their 
loans, Council of Elders can exert powerful social pressure, including exiling people from the 
community or forbidding them to bury their family in village grounds.  In certain cases, the 
Council of Elders can also correct corrupt decisions passed down by the judicial system by 
acting not on the decision of the court but on their own judgement.  For example, if someone 
secures a cancellation of debt by bribing an official, the Council of Elders can still act as 
though that debt was not forgiven and take social action.  Additionally, the Council saves 
money because there is little need to go through the judicial system when social pressure 
works so effectively90.    
 
II: Obstacles  
Specific to MC2s, there are governance issues at all levels of management: the Board 
of Directors, the Executive Secretariat, and the Council of Elders.  A governance obstacle that 
starts from the very beginning is the endowment of the community elites with privileges that 
can create conflicts of interest later.  Because MC2s do not receive any outside funding from 
the government and they want the banks to be community-owned, when the community wants 
to create an MC2, they call on the Elites to produce the initial capital investment.  The Elites 
of each village are those who have had some measure of economic success either within the 
village or outside, and are therefore expected to give back to the community and aid its 
development.  The Elite fund the initial capital required to create the MC2, are given shares in 
the cooperative, and are frequently elected to the Board of Directors.  Additionally, to begin 
the flow of capital, they take out the first loans.  These are usually large loans, and for the 
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beginning months, the interest on these loans constitutes the majority of the banks revenue 
potential.  However, for one reason or another, these loans are rarely paid back, so that 
potential is unrealized.  Plus, the enforcement of repayment is made more complicated by the 
fact that the Board is made up primarily of Elites themselves, who have very little interest in 
enforcing payment on loans that they hold91.  Therefore, one of the primary functions of the 
Board of Directors is undermined from the very beginning of the creation process.   
Further problems have been encountered with the Board of Directors.  Because the 
COBAC regulations limit the amount of shares that can be held by any one person and the 
total that can be held by the management councils, often Presidents or Members of the Board 
will use corrupt means to secure funds from the MC2s.  For example, the President will get his 
friend to take out a loan in that friends name with the express intention of giving the money to 
the President.  The friend will be under the impression that it is the President’s responsibility, 
but the President cannot pay it back because the loan is not under his name, an intentional 
maneuver by the President92. The microfinance institution then has the triple-problem of 
having the President using the institution for personal funds, the President indirectly owning 
more than his legal share of the institution, and the institution never getting the loan paid back 
because the original applicant does not have the funds or refuses to pay back a loan he never 
benefited from.   
Furthermore, there are examples of Presidents not living in town in which the MC2 is 
based.  This severely limits the capacity of the Board of Directors or other management 
structures to implement changes or react to immediate problems.  Also, the President must be 
present at General Assembly meetings, where members meet to grant loans.  If the President 
is not present for months at a time, there cannot be loans granted, and there cannot be any 
profit-generating activity, let alone poverty alleviation.  An MC2 worker elaborates:  
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I think not having them [General Assembly meetings] creates a lack of trust in town, and a 
lack of understanding of the MC2s services and operations.  To me, it further reinforces the 
idea that the MC2 is like any for-profit entity.  The lack of GA meetings reduces 
transparency, and the chance for people to give their ideas or feedback.  They might as well 
join a for-profit bank where at least the services surpass those we offer at the MC2. (Credit 
for Sahel, for example, is the local competition…Credit du Sahel is more for-profit, but has 
correspondingly better services, and is where I keep my personal account!) 
 
Lack of trust or understanding, and a lack of transparency affect the ability of the 
microfinance firm to affect the people it needs to reach.  As previously mentioned, 
transparency has the potential to attract investors and increase faith in the institution, 
increasing the amount of people who will take advantage of the offered services.  Lack of 
personal involvement in the institution limits emotional investment, which in turn limits 
loyalty and involvement in the institution.  All of these factors harm the ability of the MC2 to 
retain their clients, reach new clients, and achieve their stated goals.   
At the level of the Executive Secretariat, the daily work of an MC2 seems to 
overwhelm the regular staff of three.  This not only means that important responsibilities get 
put off, like budgets and weekly reports93, but that MC2s have difficulty finding time to 
perform community outreach: James Beighle states “they have a social mission…they have a 
clear social mission, but they’re not really doing much with it.  They need to focus on it 
more”94.  This is precisely the reason why the Peace Corps is slowly phasing out its 
involvement with MC2s: he phrases it as:  
there's nothing within that structure that says ‘let's go out into the community and 
market our services and give loans to the poor’, so they don't, they just sit there and 
act like a traditional bank…so there's no connection between the bank and the 
community, other than the customers that come in and those customers tend to be 
fairly wealthy comparatively speaking to the population at large so they're not 
necessarily the target audience that Peace Corps wants95.   
 
It takes three to five years for an MC2 to become financial viable and it takes more after that 
to accumulate a large enough profit to engage in outreach projects96.  Hence, MC2s move 
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through a financial phase and then a social phase97.  This disconnect between the economic 
function and the social mission of the firm is a big problem because social missions are one of 
the defining characteristics of microfinance firms.  An experimental program in Njinikom, 
implemented with a grant from Plan International, hired field agents for outreach work to try 
and address this issue.  The agents identify potential savers to participate in a group account 
and, Monday through Friday, visit each participant to collect savings of at least 200 FCFA; 
savings is not mandatory each day.  Two times a month, the participants are able to withdraw 
without charge from the account, and once a month, the bank withdraws a 4% fee from the 
account.  The end goal is for 60% of the fee to cover the salary of the field agents, and the 
remaining 40% goes to the MC2 to help cover the costs of the program98.  In this way, the 
field agents would not only be providing financial services, but educating the population and 
encouraging savings for community capacity building.   
Unfortunately, in order for the program to break even, the Field Agent would need to 
consistently have 700,000 FCFA in the group account99.  Assuming every participant in the 
group program saves the minimum everyday, it would take 175 individuals to initially make 
700,000 FCFA, with no withdrawals the first month.  That is a lot of outreach in one month, 
especially in the small communities that MC2s are working with.  However, with communities 
who already have large groups formed, there is the potential for success, and actively 
encouraging savings is an excellent first step to elevation out of poverty, but there is currently 
no assessment methodology to see if indeed the MC2s are having an impact or whether they 
would have a larger impact with field agents.  This is a problem both in measuring current 
success and determining progress in the future.   
An additional problem with the staff of three is that theft is common.  This illustrates 
an important point, that corruption is not just offering bribes for services, but it also includes 
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theft and misuse of funds.  Numerous examples were cited about cashiers, accountants, and 
even Presidents of the Board stealing money, and there have even been cases where ADAF 
has detected entire staffs engaged in fraudulent activities.  Consequently, MC2s have had 
branches temporarily shut down because the whole staff has been fired100.   
Concerning the Council of Elders, the combination of social pressure and management 
works well in situations where there is an understanding between the financial and technical 
workers and those with traditional power.  Unfortunately, often there is disequilibrium in 
favour of the Council of Elders. For example, at one MC2, there is the President of the Board 
of Directors, mayor of the town, and a traditional chief.  He refused to step down from his 
post as President after his term expired, but with his compounded power and traditional status, 
no one is considered his equal.  In this situation, “you have culture and tradition bumping 
heads with rules and regulations from this institution, so who’s going to tell him, in the 
community…to go…”101  This compound power is frequently found in small villages where 
there are one or two people who have moved away and become very successful and come 
back to the village.  There is a “tendency here [in Cameroon] to defer to ‘the big people’ in 
town, even when they do not merit such confidence”102.     
ADAF in general seems to want to take a hands-off approach to these governance 
issues.  They were candid when asked about governance issues and described their role as a 
last-resort mechanism when problems get out of hand or when the problems go undetected by 
the individual MC2s103.  This seems neglectful.  ADAF has the capacity to discover problems 
otherwise undiscovered by the individual institutions, so it seems that either more frequent 
monitoring should be going on, or monitoring should be built into the MC2 model.   
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Finally, at a macro level, ANEMCAM is ineffective in its role of providing a counter-
lobby to the government and facilitating microfinance formation opportunities.  Since its 
inception, there have been no professional seminars or conferences organized by 
ANEMCAM, and there have been no revisions to microfinance policy despite the problems 
previously discussed104.   Just as there are advantages to organizing microfinance firms into a 
network, there are great advantages to organizing microfinance firms into a lobby.  It is 
crucial for the government and the microfinance firms to be able to communicate and have 
fruitful discussions, and this cannot be if there is no united entity with whom the government 
can engage.   
 
III: Recommendations  
To address these problems of governance in the MC2s, there are several levels of 
action: individual MC2s, ADAF, and the microfinance sector generally in Cameroon.  On the 
level of individual microfinance firms, the first is to set up a mechanism to measure the 
impact of poverty reduction efforts.  This would help the evaluation of specific firms and 
expose further areas of improvement.  Secondly, it is necessary to create a no-tolerance 
environment for theft and misdirection of funds.  In this way, the social power can work 
greatly to the advantage of MC2s.  The Council of Elders in each town can publish a 
condemnation of corruption as a direct attack against the community, for example.  Also, a 
revised code of ethics would also help.  Right now, the Code is general to the extreme105.  
While it is an important first step to institute ethics as a concern in business, the next step is to 
create a culture around ethics, and citing specific violations in the code of ethics is beneficial 
to deterrence and enforcement practices.  Finally, MC2s should continue to look for 
opportunities to expand their social mission.  By involving more members of the community 
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and opening up forums for discussion of helpful services to offer, there is increased 
opportunity for a true social impact.  
At the level of ADAF, the largest contribution that can be made is to train more people 
to be able to work and contribute at MC2s.  This would have a three-fold impact: increased 
employment in the community, directly working towards elevating the population out of 
poverty; less workload on each individual at the MC2s, increasing their efficacy and impact 
and freeing their time to design social outreach projects; and less power concentrated in each 
person’s hands, meaning a reduction in the possibility of theft or misdirection of funds.  
Additionally, there is a possibility that this could help address the high concentration of power 
among a few individuals.  By involving others in the community and having a President of the 
Board who is different from the mayor and the traditional chief, there could be a balance 
between social culture and financial regulations.   
There also must be an effort to re-evaluate the management structures of the MC2s and 
address the specific issues that exist at each MC2, either case by case or by creating a 
mechanism for each MC2 to do it themselves.  ADAF, as an impartial observer and the 
expertise in accounting and supervision, has the potential to detect and solve many more 
problems than the individual MC2s have, and therefore has the increased responsibility to 
fulfill these duties.  They cannot expect the community to completely develop themselves, as 
they have stated, without outside instruction and guidance.  Without a larger vision guiding 
individual efforts, those individual efforts can become redundant, misguided, or cyclical.  Just 
as the government must form a clear vision of development for the country, organizations 
such as ADAF must form a clear vision for the development of their institutions to more 
effectively support and direct the poverty alleviation efforts.    
Finally, at the macro level, the microfinance institutions must organize themselves into 
an effective, organized lobby to counter any obstacles posed by government regulations.  
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Without equal presence in the dialogues between the government and the microfinance sector, 
the government can take advantage of its power and act only in its own interest.  The 
microfinance firms must be able to represent themselves or there will never be a constructive 
environment for microfinance to flourish.  The regulations will never change without a 
reason, and the government will not know what actions to take to improve the general 
environment or the general operating atmosphere for microfinance without any input from the 
industry.  Whether this organization is a reinterpretation of ANEMCAM or there is a separate 
organization set up, this lobby is necessary to the continued and future success of 
microfinance.     
However, there is also much for other microfinance organizations to learn from the 
MC2, Afriland, and ADAF partnership.  The combination of field work of the MC2s, the 
technical assistance and training provided by ADAF, and the financial backing and guidance 
given by Afriland allows each organization to fulfill its purpose without needlessly 
concerning themselves with extraneous information or areas in which they have no expertise.  
An interesting aspect to explore would be the benefits of linking other commercial banks with 
microfinance institutions to see if that does in fact affect the perception of the microfinance 
institution and therefore increase their efficacy.  Afriland and ADAF certainly offer 
advantages to MC2s and, with the implementation of an impact-evaluation mechanism, it 
would be possible to see to what extent instituting these partner organizations could affect the 
efficacy of other microfinance institutions.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, there are actions that can be taken by both the government and the 
microfinance institutions themselves to increase the efficacy of microfinance in Cameroon.  
By encouraging participation in micro-credit activities, sensitizing the target market to the 
benefits and proper management of microfinance, and increasing the general health of the 
operating environment for the microfinance institutions, the government can properly 
augment the potential of the industry to continue to fulfill its economic and social mission.  
By changing management structures, emphasizing transparency and accountability, and 
increasing internal auditing and monitoring capabilities, microfinance institutions can put 
management structures in place which are more conducive to larger-scale operations and 
increased ability to reach the poor.  But what is most important is for both sides to take a 
realistic approach to the responsibilities that come with their respective duties and to work to 
fulfill those responsibilities.  In the end, the goal of development should take precedence over 
all, and it should be understood that all recommendations in this paper have been made with 
that end in mind.   
It should also be considered that governance should be a value in and of itself.  There 
can be arguments made in favor of good governance because of efficiency and other 
quantitative or qualitative criteria, but in the end good governance practices, like good 
principles, should ideally be valued for their very nature.  Therefore, the first problem to be 
addressed, and perhaps the most difficult, is to understand why good governance is not 
happening in the current environment, and create a culture around valuing good governance 
for itself and not for what it can do.   
Microfinance is simply a vehicle for financial and economic development; it should 
not be deified or worshipped as the solution to all the world’s woes, particularly with all the 
governance difficulties it is currently experiencing.  It is far from being perfect, and far from 
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perfectly fulfilling its potential.  But, for MC2s, the smallest steps will have the largest 
consequences, and addressing problems in governance is not a Band-Aid solution, it does not 
treat the symptoms of microfinance or of the governmental inefficiency.  Instead, it addresses 
the sources.  All governance changes will not only increase current efficiency, but will 
exponentially increase the ability of the micro-banks to alleviate poverty.  This combined with 
an increased emphasis on development from the government will foster sustainable changes 
in the basic economy of the country, and, hopefully, begin to encourage good governance as a 
principle, and not just for the end it provides.     
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